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ABSTRACT The study demonstrates how the EU contributes to a self-reinforcing 
administrative bias due to domestic-level organizational factors. Strong European integration 
without membership reinforces a politico-administrative gap and this gap expands over time. 
The paper applies an extreme case of high integration without formal EU membership 
represented by Norway. The findings suggest that the EU contributes to reinforce the 
administrative state through strong unintended assimilation effects. The findings are probed 
by a novel and comprehensive longitudinal data-set consisting of a large-N single case 
(N=3562) questionnaire study among government officials at three points in the Norwegian 
central administration: 1996, 2006 and 2016. Theoretically, the paper examines the role of 
organizational factors in administrative integration and how the impact of the EU is mediated 
by organizational variables at the national level. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The “Administrative State”, originally coined by Dwight Waldo, emphasizes the central role of 
public administration in democratic governance (Olsen 2018; March and Olsen 1984: 741; 
Waldo 1947). This paper presents a single case study that shows the profound and rising role 
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of public administration in the multilevel governing system of the European Union (EU). A 
recent branch of literature has documented an emergent European multilevel administrative 
system (MLA) consisting of strongly interconnected administrative bodies across levels of 
governance (cf. Bauer and Trondal 2015). Administrative capacity-building by stealth at the 
EU-level is seen as challenging administrative autonomy among the member-state 
governments (e.g. Genschel and Jachtenfuchs 2014; Trondal 2010). These studies also suggest 
how the an organizationally heterogeneous EU sends a plethora of differentiated ´signals´ to 
the member-states, for example how the Council fuels strong member-state coordination and 
perceptions of national preferences whereas the Commission fuels a circumvention of 
domestic political control and privileges non-majoritarian bodies (e.g. Egeberg et al. 2003; 
Trondal and Veggeland 2003). This paper makes two contributions to this literature:  
- Theoretically, it examines the role of organizational factors in administrative 
integration and thus advances an organizational approach to public governance 
(Egeberg and Trondal 2018; Olsen 2018). This theoretical approach emphasizes how 
organizational factors bias governance processes. By biasing and nudging actors´ 
attention towards certain problems and solutions, certain policy outcomes more likely 
than others. Administrative integration, this paper argues, is nudged by ´favorable´ 
organizational conditions at the domestic level of government.  
- Empirically, the paper demonstrates how the EU contributes to a self-reinforcing 
administrative bias due to domestic-level organizational factors. Strong European 
integration without membership reinforces a politico-administrative gap and this gap 
expands over time. The paper applies an extreme case of high integration without 
formal EU membership represented by Norway. The data suggests that the EU 
contributes to reinforce the administrative state through strong unintended 
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assimilation effects. To demonstrate how essential parameters of domestic public 
governance are profoundly influenced by the EU even in a non-EU member-state, the 
paper presents a novel longitudinal data-set consisting of a large-N (N=3562) 
questionnaire study collected by the authors among government officials at three 
points in the Norwegian central administration: 1996, 2006 and 2016. The self-
reinforcing administrative bias is illuminated by Norwegian government officials 
dealing with the EU being increasingly loosely coupled to the political level (low-
ranked staff) and (surprisingly) and tightly interwoven and influenced by EU 
institutions. 
 
The paper contributes to a ´public administration turn´ in EU studies (e.g. Bauer and Trondal 
2015; Egeberg 2006; Trondal 2007). Essential to this turn has been to understand the role of 
administrative actors in political-administrative life of the EU (Olsen 2018). The inherent state 
prerogative of preparing policy-making and getting things done has been challenged by the 
rise of independent and integrated administrative capacities at the EU level. The supply of 
organizational capacities inside the European Commission – together with the rise of EU 
agencies – has enabled an emergent EU-level executive order to act independently of 
domestic government institutions (Egeberg and Trondal 2017). Moreover, organizational 
capacities of EU-level administrative actors supply them with a capacity to influence non-
majoritarian institutions (agencies) at domestic level (e.g. Egeberg 2006). This paper shows 
how the impact of the EU is mediated by organizational variables at the national level. 
Moreover, This study provides novel data from the core-executive level of government 
(ministerial departments), and thereby adds to a literature that empirically has been 
dominated by studies of agencies. Methodologically, the empirical probe is hard by examining 
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the government administration of a formally non-EU-member state – the Norwegian central 
administration. As such, the paper contributes to studies of external differentiation of the EU 
and the external effects of EU norms and rules beyond EU borders (see Rittberger and 
Blauberger 2018). Still, compared to contemporary instances of EU external governance, 
Norway is by far the most strongly integrated EU non-member through a dense web of 
institutionalized relations (Egeberg and Trondal 1999; Lavenex 2011; Fossum and Graver 
2018). This affiliated status grants the Norwegian central administration privileged access to 
most parts of the EU administration, which in turn paves the way for deep administrative 
integration. Moreover, administrative integration might go even further in affiliated non-
member states than in member states due to their exclusion from political representation at 
EU level. This paper shows how a lack of political representation in the Council (and the 
European Parliament) mobilizes an administrative bias in the core-executive of government. 
Consequently, integration may happen more easily by stealth in affiliated states such as 
Norway – even though the official position is not to become a political member (Majone 
2005).  
 
The paper is presented as follows: The next section outlines an organizational approach to 
administrative integration beyond membership. The next section presents the data-set and 
methodology succeeded by a presentation and discussion of empirical findings. The paper 
concludes with key findings and some suggestions for future research. 
 
AN ORGANIZATIONAL APPROACH TO ADMINISTRATIVE INTEGRATION  
Public administration is not a technical apparatus or tool in the hands of shifting 
governments. An organizational approach emphasizes that public administration might be an 
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important agent in its own right. This theoretical framework is grounded on the assumption 
that internal organizational characteristics of public administration may explain how it works 
and changes. Consequently, organizational factors help explaining just how domestic 
ministries ‘adopt’ the influence of the EU – and thus how integration may happen even 
without formal EU membership and affect the pursuit of domestic public governance 
(Egeberg et al. 2016; Egeberg and Trondal 2015; March and Olsen 1989; Olsen 2009: 24; 
Trondal and Bauer 2017).  
 
The literature harbour competing ideas on the extent to which actual decision behaviour 
reflects the organization structure within which actors are embedded – such as public choice 
theories, organizational sociology, and representative bureaucracy (see Niskanen 1971; 
Meyer and Rowan 1977; Meier and Capers 2012). While some observers ascribe lack of 
government action to political leaders’ lack of will, this paper advocates that political will is 
profoundly shaped endogenously by organizational positions which also enable (and 
constrain) action. This paper follows what Johan Olsen (2018) recently coined the “Bergen 
approach” in political science, emphasizing the organizational dimension of politics. An 
organizational approach posits that organizational factors are not merely an expression of 
symbol politics (Meyer and Rowan 1977; Brunsson 1989) but create systematic bias in human 
behaviour and decision-making processes by directing and nudging choice and attention 
towards certain problems and solutions, i.e. making certain outcomes more likely than others 
(Bækgaard 2010; Gulick 1937; Hammond 1990; Thaler and Sunstein 2009). Contemporary 
organization theory literature focuses on the explanatory power of organizational factors 
(Egeberg 2012; Egeberg and Trondal 2018). Two reasons are given for focusing on 
organizational structure: First, empirical studies demonstrate the systematic and significant 
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effect of organization structure on decision-making behaviour (e.g. Christensen and Lægreid 
2007; Trondal 2006; Egeberg et al. 2016).  Secondly, organization structure, compared to 
other factors that intervene in the policy process, is likely to be more subject to deliberate 
change and may thus be an important design instrument of the context of choice in public 
governance (Egeberg et. al 2016; Thaler and Sunstein 2009).   
 
An organization structure is a normative structure composed of rules and roles specifying, 
more or less clearly, who is expected to do what, and how (Scott and Davis 2016). The 
structure regulates actors’ access to decision processes, broadly defines the interests and 
goals that are to be pursued, delimits the types of considerations and alternatives that should 
be treated as relevant, and establishes action capacity by assigning certain tasks to certain 
roles. It influences decision-making behaviour by providing individuals with ‘a systematic and 
predictable selection of problems, solutions and choice opportunities’ (March and Olsen 
1976). Whilst organizational structure does not necessarily predict nor determine actual 
decision-making behaviour, it does make some choices become more likely than others (e.g. 
Egeberg and Trondal 2018). This happens by regulating actors´ access to decision situations, 
mobilizing attention to certain problems and solutions, structuring patterns of conflict and 
cooperation (and thus influencing power relationships), and enabling coordination and 
steering along certain dimensions rather than others. This entails that organizational factors 
do not impact directly on society; rather, societal consequences can normally only occur via 
governance processes and public policies. Bounded rationality (Simon 1957) is one of three 
key mechanisms that connect role expectations to actual behaviour; the organizational 
structure helps simplify actors’ cognitive worlds by directing attention towards a selection of 
possible problems and solutions and ways to connect them. This concept holds that decision-
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makers operate under three limitations: limited information about possible solutions and 
alternatives, limited cognitive capacity to evaluate and process information, and limited time 
to make decisions. Consequently, actors opt for a selection of satisfactory alternatives instead 
of optimal ones and often turn to their immediate surroundings and readily available data and 
knowledge to find suitable choices (Simon 1957). The second mechanism, the logic of 
appropriateness, views human action as driven by internalized perceptions of what is 
perceived as appropriate (March and Olsen 1989). Lastly, actors may find that rule and role 
compliance is in accordance with their own self-interest. Organizations are thus seen as 
incentive systems that administer rewards and punishments (e.g. Ostrom and Ostrom 2015). 
In sum, these mechanisms may explain why structural characteristics within central 
administrations bias how the EU ´hits´ domestic government institutions. Essential to this 
paper is examining how different structural characteristics of core-executive institutions 
matter in this respect. Three such structural variables are outlined in the following: horizontal 
specialization, vertical specialization and organizational affiliations.  
 
Horizontal specialization 
Horizontal specialization refers to how tasks or portfolios are divided horizontally within and 
between organizations. Those policy areas that are encompassed by the same organizational 
unit are supposed to be more coordinated than those that belong to different units. Luther 
Gulick (1937) contemplated four fundamental principles of horizontal specialization, namely 
specialization according to (i) territory, (ii) sector/purpose, (iii) function/process and (iv) 
clientele. He also emphasized the mutual relationship between specialization and 
coordination; dossiers that are encompassed by the same organizational unit are more likely 
to be coordinated than those belonging to different units. Accordingly, empirical studies show 
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that while an overwhelming majority of officials finds coordination to work effectively within 
their own unit, this holds only for a minority between departments (Kassim et al. 2013: 188-
89). Therefore, the departmental affiliation of various policy units could make a significant 
difference. In the same vein, cleavages of conflict were assumed to reflect these principles of 
specialization. For example, specialization according to purpose is likely to mobilize sectoral 
lines of cooperation and conflict and thereby foster policy consistency within its respected 
field. We thus expect that officials that are embedded in organizations that are primarily 
specialized by purpose would coordinate more strongly within their respective policy domains 
than across these domains. In the case of government ministries, we thus expected that 
officials in sector ministries report stronger intra-ministerial than inter-ministerial 
coordination. 
 
Yet, domestic public administration in the EU consists within a larger politico-administrative 
order. Consequently, organizational compatibilities within such an order might matter. 
Though transnational cooperation on issue-specific tasks and practices has existed for 
decades, the EU executive centre has emerged as a more challenging actor within regulatory 
networks (e.g. Majone 1996; Dehousse 1997; Levi-Faur 2011; Egeberg and Trondal 2015; 
Joosen and Brandsma 2017). Essentially, the executive centre at EU-level (concentrated at the 
Commission and EU agencies (e.g. Bauer and Trondal 2015; Egeberg 2006)) is mainly 
specialized according to purpose (sector) and function (process), largely compatible to 
national central administrations. Arguably, organizational compatibility across levels of 
governance is likely to facilitate sectoral allegiances and cooperation across levels of 
governance. Studies have shown that organizations that are specialized according to similar 
organizational principles tend to align more easily across levels of governance than those 
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institutions that are organized according to different principles (e.g. Martens 2010). Hence, 
the effects of organizational principles at one level of governance may be conditioned by the 
degree of organizational compatibility across levels (e.g. Cowles et. al 2001; Knill and 
Lehmkuhl 1999; March and Olsen 1995). Commission DGs and their system of expert 
committees are largely organized similarly as domestic sector ministries (purpose). By 
contrast domestic ministries of foreign affairs (MFA) are mainly specialized according to 
territory and thus organizationally compatible to the core structure of the Council of Ministers 
(Council). This suggests that domestic sector ministries are likely to align with the Commission 
DGs more than with the Council structure. Moreover, the continuous expansion of scope and 
content in the EEA agreement (from 1994 onwards) gives reasons to believe this pattern, if 
anything, has expanded over time. The following propositions are derived:  
P1: Due to organizational compatibility, officials in sector ministries are more likely to interact 
with the Commission than with other EU institutions.  
P2: The coordination of EU-related work is relatively lower between than within ministries. 
 
Vertical specialization 
Vertical specialization denotes division of responsibility and labour within and between levels 
of authority. This paper focuses empirically on the effect of hierarchy – or vertical 
specialization - within ministerial departments. Hierarchy between organizations provides 
certain decision inputs, e.g. a more general view in hierarchical superior units compared to 
lower ranked units, that cannot easily be achieved through purely horizontal arrangements. 
Vertical specialization between organizations means to modify hierarchy by installing an 
organizational boundary between a superior and a subordinate unit. Agencification, the 
process whereby regulatory tasks are hived off from ministerial departments into semi-
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independent regulatory bodies, is a topical example. The New Public Management (NPM) 
wave that swept across OECD states during the 1980s and -90s made pleas for greater 
autonomy, fragmentation and proliferation of public administration institutions and systems. 
As one result, vertical specialization in the form of structural devolution became a major 
reform trend across Europe (in public administration terms: agencification; in organizational 
terms: inter-organizational vertical specialization). This reform thread led to semi-
autonomous agencies enjoying ever more degrees of autonomy at both the national and the 
EU levels (e.g. Lægreid et al. 2010; Bezes et al. 2013). Hierarchy within ministries – or intra-
organizational vertical specialization - is measured in this paper by official’s rank within their 
respective ministry (see below). Within organizations, it has been demonstrated that leaders 
identify with a larger part of the organization than those at lower levels. Leaders also interact 
more frequently across organizational units and are exposed to broader flows of information 
than their subordinates. Higher ranked staff in both ministries and subordinated agencies is 
shown to be more attentive to political signals than lower ranked personnel (e.g. Egeberg and 
Sætren 1999; Christensen and Lægreid 2009). This implies that leaders are better equipped to 
take into consideration a wider set of goals, alternatives and consequences when making 
choices (Egeberg and Trondal 2018).  Studies show that top-ranked staff tend to identify more 
frequently with organizations as wholes than staff located at lower echelons (Egeberg and 
Sætren 1999). Additionally, these officials are exposed to a broader range of information than 
lower level staff and thus may be more attentive to broader organizational perspectives than 
lower ranked personnel (Egeberg and Trondal 2018). It follows that government officials with 
lower ranks are more loosely coupled to the political leadership and have a more local 
perspective on task execution compared to higher ranked staff. This has one important 
implication: a relative degree of insulation from political leadership makes lower-ranked 
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officials more eligible receivers of impulses from EU-level institutions and processes. The 
following proposition is derived: 
P3: Ministerial officials at higher ranks are less likely to be strongly involved in EU-related 
work and thereby less likely to interact with EU institutions compared to ministerial officials at 
lower ranks. 
 
Organizational affiliation 
Organizational affiliations consist of primary and secondary structures. A ‘primary structure’ is 
defined as the structure to which participants are expected to devote most of their loyalty, 
time and energy. A typical example would be a bureaucratic unit like a ministry. A ‘secondary 
structure’ is defined as the structure to which participants are expected to be part-timers. It 
follows that secondary structures is unlikely to shape actors’ decision behaviour to the same 
extent as primary structures. Secondary structures include collegial bodies, committees and 
networks (Egeberg 2012). The EU multilevel administrative system is comprised of a set of 
inter-connected organizations at different levels of authority. Ministerial officials that operate 
within this frame are likely to be exposed to several behavioural premises from their primary 
and secondary affiliations. Empirical studies show that interdepartmental committees, 
regional councils, and public-private governing arrangements enhance interaction and 
coordination, and erect trust-relationships among the participants, however, the effects are 
moderate (Stigen 1991; Lægreid et al. 2016; Jacobsen 2015; Ansell and Gash 2008). 
Moreover, a logic of primacy suggests that the primary affiliation is likely to affect behaviour 
more extensively than the secondary (March 1994). The following propositions are derived: 
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P4: When taking part in both primary and secondary structures, ministerial officials are likely 
to attend to and emphasize signals from both structures, albeit most strongly from primary 
structures.  
P5: When in conflict, ministerial officials are more likely to emphasize signals from primary 
than from secondary affiliations. 
 
DATA AND METHODS 
The study benefits from a unique data set on the role of central administration in the public 
governance process. Over the last thirty years, a group of Norwegian scholars, including the 
authors, has each decade conducted surveys in the Norwegian central administration (1976, 
1986, 1996, 2006 and 2016). The data sets include questions about the civil servants´ 
background, careers, contact patterns, priorities, perceptions about power, reforms and 
internationalization. From 1996 the surveys included questions about the central 
administration´s relations with the EU. This paper contain data from 1996, 2006 and 2016, 
giving an overall N of 3562. At all periods, the survey was sent to all officials at the level 
equivalent to the ‘A-level’ with a minimum of one year in office. Appointment at this level 
usually requires a university degree. Hence, the sample of this survey is the total universe of 
‘A-level’ civil servants in Norwegian ministries (see the Appendix for an overview of ministries 
included). These surveys represent the ‘most thorough screening’ of the Norwegian central 
administration, and thus the most comprehensive data-base on the effects of European 
integration on national government administrations (see also Geuijen et al. 2008). To allow 
for comparisons, the questionnaires are kept nearly identical over time with just few 
necessary adjustments. Whereas the survey from 1996 was distributed to the respondents by 
postal mail, the 2006 and 2016 surveys were conducted as online surveys by the Norwegian 
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Centre for Research Data (NSD). All data sets have been stored and made publicly available by 
NSD. The overall response rate is solid and the total response rates have decreased only 
marginally during this 20 years’ period. The drop in response rates from 1996 to 2016 may 
only partly stem from a change of survey technology from postal survey to online survey. The 
main explanation for decreasing response rates is a general fatigue among respondents 
towards surveys.  
 
Two caveats should be mentioned: Firstly, studies that rely on respondents own behavioural 
perceptions do not observe directly public governance processes or behaviour. Respondents 
may exaggerate or downplay own role or the role of others. Yet, the use of three large-N 
surveys does, however, substantially increase the likelihood of robust conclusions. Moreover, 
the use of multiple proxies increases the validity of measurement. Secondly, the use of cross-
sectional data may be biased by inter-individual variability in perceptions or that it fails to take 
into account concurring factors that may influence outcome. Ideally, in order to draw robust 
conclusions on causal effects, research on developments over time should benefit from 
longitudinal panel data. Nonetheless, this does not mean that cross-sectional data cannot 
provide useful and interesting insights as regards continuity and change.  
 
--Table 1 about here-- 
 
ADMINISTRATIVE INTEGRATION WITHOUT MEMBERSHIP  
This section demonstrates how the EU contributes to a self-reinforcing administrative bias in 
extreme cases of high integration without membership. Over time, this administrative bias 
shows a self-reinforcing effect: Norwegian officials dealing with the EU are increasingly far 
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from the political level and are strongly “Europeanized” by being tightly interwoven and 
influenced by EU institutions.  
 
This partly reflect the dynamic character of the EEA agreement which requires Norwegian law 
to continuously adjust to new EU legislation. The agreement is based on the premise of 
dynamic homogeneity and currently more than 11,000 EU acts have been incorporated into 
the agreement (Fossum and Graver 2018: 47). The agreement covers the Single Market 
acquis and a number of additional policy fields – making it the most extensive form of 
agreement between the EU and a non-member as regards regulatory scope and the legal 
obligations resulting from the contractual relations (Fossum and Graver 2018; Lavenex 2011). 
At the same time, the agreement blocks Norwegian governments qua state from political 
representation in the Council. Nonetheless, whereas Norway’s associated status does not 
grant Norway formal access to EU’s decision-making institutions, it provides for administrative 
participation at various stages of EU´s legislative process. Norwegian ministries and agencies 
are represented in Commission expert committees and comitology committees, sit on most 
EU agencies boards and committees, and are entitled to second national experts to the 
Commission. Norwegian civil servants are thus granted privileged access to EU-related work 
and are largely responsible for handling everyday relationships with EU institutions - in up-
stream processes (the agenda setting processes) and particularly in down-stream processes 
(the implementation and practising of EU law). Thus, whereas Norway is politically side-lined 
in EU decision-making processes, the Norwegian national central administration is granted 
favoured access to the EU bureaucratic apparatus, quite similar to that of EU member states 
(see below).  
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The launch of the EEA agreement in 1994 marked the beginning of a new area of dense 
administrative integration between EU institutions and the Norwegian central administration. 
At the time the EEA agreement was viewed as a prelude and an interim-period towards full EU 
membership as the prospects of such were both open as well as vigorously pursued by the 
then-government. However, the following rejection of EU membership in a heated national 
referendum reintroduced the EEA agreement as Norway´s foundational connection to the EU 
in the years to come. Additionally, close historical and cultural ties as well as common 
interests in a host of policy areas led to subsequent agreements in areas outside the 
framework of the EEA agreement (Meld.St 5 (2012-13)). At present there are approximately 
130 agreements between the Norway and the EU, with the EEA and Schengen being the most 
encompassing. In effect, while the form of affiliation has remained stable during the past 20 
years, the scope of the affiliation has undergone significant expansion - partly in response to 
policy progressions in the EU, partly in response to the dynamic character of the EEA 
agreement, and partly because of Norway signing ever-more sectoral agreements with the 
EU. In sum, this has increased the subsequent likelihood of Norwegian government 
institutions and governance processes being affected by EU-level institutions and processes. 
 
Quite similar to the Commission and EU agencies, the Norwegian central administration is 
organized according to the principles of purpose and function. From an organizational 
perspective, this has two substantial implications: firstly, it is likely to encourage sectoral 
allegiances and integration across levels of governance, and secondly to underpin national 
inter-ministerial fragmentation. Moreover, as far as policy harmonization is concerned, the 
form of affiliation does in fact warrant EEA countries the same level of integration as full 
member states. Since Norway is not subjected to political representation in the Council, it has 
16 
 
been argued that Norwegian sector ministries are likely to be even more strongly ´hit´ by the 
Commission than member states´ ministries (Egeberg and Trondal 1999; Trondal 2002). This 
assumption, however, is beyond the scope of this paper. 
 
Like most core executives, the Norwegian central administration is organized into core-
executive ministries and subordinated agencies. The system is characterized by a ministerial 
primacy where subordinated agencies are subject to political control and administrative 
accountability from the responsible minister and not primarily from a government collegium. 
The total number of employees within the central administration1 has increased from around 
13000 in 1994 to 21000 in 2015 of which 4600 are employed in the ministries and the 
remaining 16400 are employed in subordinate agencies (DiFi 2015). Whilst Norwegian 
ministries are secretariats for the political leadership with planning and coordinating 
functions (Christensen and Lægreid 2009), agencies are mainly responsible for advising 
ministries and being technical helpers, but are also essential ingredients in the political 
processes of preparing policies and implementing and administering policies.   
 
Our survey asked ministerial officials how, in general, affected they are by the 
EU/EEA/Schengen in their daily work. Table 2 displays an overall stability in this regard over 
time, yet with a small increase during the last decade. In the remaining, only those officials 
who report being affected (to a fairly small degree, or more) by the EU/EEA/Schengen are 
included in the analysis.  
 
                                                 
1 Includes all employees in ministries and subordinate units. For full list, see https://www.difi.no/rapporter-og-statistikk/nokkeltall-og-
statistikk/ansatte-i-staten#4817  
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--Table 2 about here-- 
 
Ministry officials were asked about their contacts and participation in EU-level institutions. 
Table 3 reveals two main patterns: First, stability over time in multi-level participation and 
secondly how organizational affiliation matter in this regards (P1). First, whilst we observe 
increased contact between sector ministries, the Commission, expert committees and 
comitology committees from 1996 to 2006, these patterns remain stable during the last 
decade. This suggests that Norwegian ministries have experienced a threshold in its access to 
the EU administration. Correspondingly, the gap between the sector ministries and the MFA 
shows a notable increase between 1996 and 2006, and then remains stable from 2006 to 
2016. This gap reflects organizational compatibility between sector ministries and the EU 
administration (P2). One additional explanation is that the EEA agreement makes the 
Commission the main interaction partner for sector ministries, thus biasing the access 
structure for Norwegian ministries vis-à-vis EU institutions. Also, worth noting is that whereas 
contacts towards the Commission have remained stable during the past decade, sector 
ministries’ contacts towards EU agencies have decreased. This reflects the fact that national 
agencies have acquired a larger position as access-points for EU agencies (see Egeberg and 
Trondal 2015). Secondly, the data shows that ministry affiliation matters (P1) since Table 3 
reveals a substantial difference between staff affiliated to sector ministries and staff affiliated 
to the MFA. Except for the European Parliament (2016 data only), sector ministries are 
consistently more involved with EU-institutions, even the Council. Moreover, reflecting 
compatible principles of organization, officials from sector ministries tend to concentrate 
attention towards the Commission, EU agencies and Commission expert committees, whereas 
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officials from the MFA give more attention to the Council. As mentioned above, this patterns 
also reflect the access structure embedded in the EEA agreement. 
 
--Table 3 about here-- 
 
Next, respondents were asked about their coordination behaviour. Table 4 reveals an overall 
low level of coordination of EU-related work and an increasing reliance on intra-ministerial 
coordination over time. In support of P2, coordination is slightly higher within ministries than 
between ministries at all three points in time. Moreover, the gap between intra-ministerial 
and low-level inter-ministerial coordination appears to increase over time. Since the Foreign 
Office chairs the high-level inter-ministerial coordination committee, these data also testify 
the declining role of the FO over time. This in sum shows rising reliance on sector ministries 
and sector specialists and less on the generalists from the FO. Also worth noting is the general 
decrease in this type of coordination behaviour, particularly from 2006 to 2016. One 
important caveat should be noted though: Although a common assumption is that the 
primary objective of coordination committees is to coordinate, studies have shown low level 
of substantial coordination in inter-ministerial coordination committees (Trondal 2001). These 
committees are characterized by mutual inter-ministerial information-sharing but low level of 
coordination of tasks, policies and positions. Moreover, bearing in mind that EU-affectedness 
has remained stable over time (Table 2), one may contemplate that the decrease in 
coordination behaviour reflect EU-related work becoming more routinized, which in turn 
diminishes needs for formal dialogue through committees. 
 
--Table 4 about here-- 
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As proposed (P3), Table 5 confirms that officials’ rank is negatively associated with interaction 
with EU-level institutions. The finding is robust since the pattern unfolds consistently over 
time both with regards to contacts with various EU-institutions and participation in EU 
committees – including those under EU agencies. In other words, coordination is consistently 
exercised by low-level bureaucrats, thus reinforcing a politico-administrative gap. 
Interestingly, Table 5 shows a 10 to 15 percent increase of interaction with EU-level 
institutions for low-level officials from 2006 to 2016 and a corresponding decrease in 
interaction for medium and high-level officials on all variables. This provides further support 
to the assumption of a self-reinforcing politico-administrative gap. Moreover, the sheer 
increase in interaction is also fostered by an increasing number of agreements between 
Norway and the EU, affecting ever more policy areas and government officials.  
 
--Table 5 about here-- 
 
A similar analysis (Table 6) on the effect of rank on coordination behaviour reveals a similar 
pattern: A negative correlation between rank and participation in coordination committees 
and a parallel negative correlation between rank and those reporting that their ministry’s 
work has been subject to coordination from the Prime Minister’s Office, the MFA, other 
ministries, the parliament, and/or interest groups. Officials at low ranks score consistently 
higher on these variables than do officials at medium and high ranks. This finding is also 
consistent over time, supporting the observation of a self-reinforcing politico-administrative 
gap. This behaviour, we argue, measures degrees of involvement in EU-work, not merely 
coordination as such. It follows that lower level officials will enjoy a more comprehensive view 
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of their ministry’s EU-related work compared to higher level officials. Supporting these 
findings in greater detail, Table 6 displays increased participation in high-level coordination 
committees from around 55 percent in 1996/2006 to almost 70 percent in 2016. Moreover, 
from 2006 to 2016 our data shows an average of 11 percent increase in participation of lower 
level officials in the three types of coordination committees. A similar pattern can be found 
when examining modification/change due to coordination with other actors: from 2006 to 
2016 we see an average of 16 percent increase in lower level officials reporting that their 
ministry’s work had been modified or changed due to the actors listed above.  
 
--Table 6 about here-- 
 
Table 7 examines whether various types of coordination behaviour are mutually 
supplementary or contradictory and thus deemed important by the same officials. To merely 
probe patterns, Table 7 applies two sets of variables from the 2016 survey: The degree to 
which officials participate in intra- and inter-ministerial coordination committees (variables 1 
to 3) and the extent to which they report that own ministry´s position in EU related work are 
modified due to coordination with various other institutions (variables 4 to 8). The findings 
suggest that different coordination behaviour tend to be mutually supplementary, but also 
that that substantive coordination is weakly associated with participation in coordination 
committees. From the latter we infer that coordination committees, albeit meeting actively, 
are not instrumental coordinating devices in EU related work.  
 
--Table 7 about here-- 
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Next, Table 8 illustrates the perceived importance of both primary and secondary structures 
(P4). Two main findings are displayed: As proposed, primary structures are deemed 
significantly more important than secondary structures. Moreover, this pattern is robust over 
time. The most noteworthy change is the increased importance ascribed to national agencies 
from 1996 to 2016. This finding reflects the ‘agencification’ wave in Norway, as in most OECD 
countries, during the same time period (e.g. Verhoest et al. 2010) and the parallel 
´agencification´ of the EU administration (Egeberg and Trondal 2017). Whilst Table 3 revealed 
decreasing contacts between sector ministries and EU agencies, Table 7 shows a 
corresponding decrease in perceived importance of EU agencies. This finding reflects the 
increased importance of national agencies, and not ministerial departments, as national 
access-points for EU agencies. Studies have demonstrated a tendency for EU agencies to 
bypass the ministerial level and interact directly with the national agencies contributing to a 
´direct´ multilevel administrative structure (e.g. Egeberg and Trondal 2009a). This may have 
off-loaded some EU-workload from the ministerial level.   
 
--Table 8 about here-- 
 
Finally, to probe P5, respondents were asked to reflect on conflict behaviour: They were 
questioned how they prioritize when conflicts appear between the wishes of their political 
leadership and the requirements of EU law in their EU-related work. Table 9 demonstrates 
that, when in conflict, most ministerial officials seek to compromise between the wishes of 
their political leadership and the requirements of EU law. This suggests that ministry officials, 
not only agency officials as studied by Egeberg and Trondal (2009b), are ‘double hatted’ in 
their EU-related work. Moreover, Table 9 illuminates the intrusiveness of the ‘double-hatted’ 
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national central administrations since ministry officials seem to serve ‘two masters’. This 
observation is an even stronger probe of the idea a national ‘double hatted’ central 
administration, given that ministry officials are less likely to ‘go Brussels’ than agency officials 
simply by being more strongly bound by national political steering. Among the few 
respondents reporting being ‘single hatted’, their primary structures (the wishes of own 
political leadership) is deemed slightly more important than secondary structures (the 
requirement of EU law).  
 
--Table 9 about here-- 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
The paper has made two main contributions: Theoretically, it examines the role of 
organizational factors in public governance in general and in administrative integration in 
particular. The data suggests that administrative integration is promoted and nudged by 
´favourable´ organizational conditions at the domestic level of government. Moreover, the 
paper highlights how strong integration without political membership in the EU fuels the 
administrative state. Following the public administration turn in EU studies, one might also 
envisage that while a member-state withdraws from political membership in the EU, domestic 
agencies might find themselves somehow integrated with EU administrative networks. 
Moreover, the observed mechanism may play out more generally in other (member) states; 
i.e. the observed general EU coordination techniques could also be expected to have similar 
effects in member states, especially the higher involvement of lower ranks than involvement 
of higher (more political) levels. The general theoretical idea is captured by the public 
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administration approach to European integration that sees the EU as consisting of 
interconnected sets of agencies, ministries and regulatory networks.  
 
Empirically, this study demonstrates how the EU contributes to a self-reinforcing 
administrative bias in domestic core executives. To do so, the paper applies an extreme case 
of high integration without formal EU membership. Over time, this administrative bias gets a 
self-reinforcing effect: Norwegian officials dealing with the EU are increasingly far from the 
political level (low-ranked staff) and are (surprisingly) strongly “Europeanized” by being tightly 
interwoven and influenced by EU institutions. In greater detail, the data consistently displays 
a relatively high degree of interaction between sector ministries and EU-level executive 
institutions (P1). It also affirms a higher level of coordination within than between ministries 
(P2) and that officials of lower ranks are more extensively involved at the EU-level than 
officials of higher ranks (P4). Finally, the importance of primary organizational structures is 
affirmed (P4) and the data demonstrates a strong tendency of ‘double-hattedness’ amongst 
ministerial officials (P5). Future longitudinal studies are needed that document continuity and 
change in patterns of administrative integration. 
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APPENDIX: LIST OF MINISTRIES IN SURVEY (2016) 
Office of the Prime Minister  
Ministry of Agriculture and Food  
Ministry of Children and Equality 
Ministry of Climate and Environment  
Ministry of Culture  
Ministry of Defense  
Ministry of Education and Research  
Ministry of Finance  
Ministry of Foreign Affairs  
Ministry of Health and Care Services  
Ministry of Justice and Public Security  
Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs  
Ministry of Local Government and Modernization  
Ministry of Petroleum and Energy  
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Ministry of Trade, Industry and Fisheries  
Ministry of Transport and Communications  
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Table 1 Summary of propositions  
 
Horizontal 
specialization  
 
P1: Due to organizational compatibility, officials in sector ministries are more likely to 
interact with the Commission than with other EU institutions. 
P2: Due to organizational compatibility, officials in sector ministries are more likely to 
interact with the Commission than with other EU institutions. 
Vertical 
specialization  
 
P3: Ministerial officials at higher ranks are less likely to be strongly involved in EU-related 
work and thereby less likely to interact with EU institutions compared to ministerial 
officials at lower ranks. 
 
Organizational 
affiliation  
P4: When taking part in both primary and secondary structures, ministerial officials are 
likely to attend to and emphasize signals from both structures, albeit most strongly from 
primary structures.  
P5: When in conflict, ministerial officials are more likely to emphasize signals from primary 
than from secondary affiliations. 
 
 
 
 
Table 2 Sample size and response rates in the ministry surveys, by year  
 1996 2006 2016 
N 1497 1874 2322 
Response rates 72% 67% 60% 
 
 
Table 3 Percentage of officials who reporting being affected by the EU/EEA/Schengen, by 
year 
 1996 2006 2016 
To a very large extent 11 13 14 
To a fairly large extent 12 12 12 
To some extent 23 18 23 
To a fairly small extent 27 21 31 
Not affected  27 37 20 
N  100 
(1463) 
100 
(1704) 
100 
(1773) 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4 Percentage of officials who report contact with* and/or participation in** EU-level 
institutions, by year and ministerial affiliation (sector ministries (SM)/Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs (MFA)) (percentages) 
 1996 2006 2016  
 SM MFA SM MFA SM MFA N 
Contact with the Commission 
 
Contact with the Council 
 
Contact with the European Parliament 
 
Contact with EU agencies 
 
Participation in expert committee(s) 
 
Participation in comitology committee(s) 
 
Participation in the Council 
 
Participation in committees, boards etc. 
in EU agencies 
68 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
82 
 
86 
 
- 
 
 
- 
32 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
18 
 
14 
 
- 
 
 
- 
83 
 
- 
 
- 
 
90 
 
95 
 
100 
 
- 
 
 
- 
17 
 
- 
 
- 
 
10 
 
5 
 
0 
 
- 
 
 
- 
83 
 
57 
 
22 
 
76 
 
89 
 
100 
 
60 
 
 
94 
17 
 
43 
 
78 
 
24 
 
11 
 
0 
 
40 
 
 
6 
100 (115) 
 
100 (21) 
 
100 (9) 
 
100 (39) 
 
100 (94) 
 
100 (21) 
 
100 (10) 
 
 
100 (18) 
* The ´contact´ variables combine values 1 and 2 on the following four-point scale: (1) App. every week, (2) app. every month, (3) a few 
times, (4) never. 
** The ´participation’ variables apply value 1 on the following three-point scale: (1) several times, (2) once, (3) never. 
 
 
Table 5 Percentage of officials who have met in ministerial coordination committees, by 
year*  
 1996 2006 2016 
Intra-ministerial coordination committees** 18 18 13 
Low-level inter-ministerial coordination committees*** 17 15 9 
High-level inter-ministerial coordination committees**** 5 7 5 
N  100 
(1038) 
100 
(1056) 
100 
(1402) 
* This table applies value 1 on a three-point scale: (1) multiple times, (2) once, (3) never. 
** These committees are established to pursue intra-ministerial coordination of EU-related work. 
*** These committees are headed by the responsible sector ministry to coordinate across affected sector ministries.  
**** This committee is headed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to coordinate those dossiers that the low-level inter-ministerial coordination 
committees do not solve. 
 
 
Table 6 Percentage of officials who report contact with* or participation in** the following 
EU-level institutions, by year and rank (lower level officials (L)***/medium and higher level 
officials (MH)**** (percentage) 
 1996 2006 2016  
 L MH L MH L MH N 
Contact with the Commission 
 
Contact with the Council 
 
Contact with the European Parliament 
 
Contact with EU agencies 
 
Participation in expert committee(s) 
 
Participation in comitology committee(s) 
 
Participation in the Council 
 
Participation in committees, boards etc. in 
EU agencies 
74 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
78 
 
71 
 
- 
 
- 
26 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
22 
 
29 
 
- 
 
- 
63 
 
- 
 
- 
 
73 
 
70 
 
70 
 
- 
 
- 
37 
 
- 
 
- 
 
27 
 
30 
 
30 
 
- 
 
- 
76 
 
90 
 
100 
 
83 
 
85 
 
86 
 
80 
 
72 
24 
 
10 
 
0 
 
17 
 
15 
 
13 
 
20 
 
28 
100 (115) 
 
100 (8) 
 
100 (20) 
 
100 (39) 
 
100 (94) 
 
100 (21) 
 
100 (10) 
 
100 (18) 
* The ´contact´ variables combine values 1 and 2 on the following four-point scale: (1) App. every week, (2) app. every month, (3) a few times, 
(4) never. 
** The ´participation’ variables apply value 1 on the following three-point scale: (1) several times, (2) once, (3) never. 
*** Lower level officials include the following ranks:  1996: executive officer, higher executive officer, principal officer, assistant director. 
2006: executive officer/adviser, principal officer/adviser, assistant director/adviser. 2016: adviser/senior adviser, specialist director/special 
adviser or equivalent. 
**** Medium and higher level officials include the following ranks: 1996: director, director general, positions higher than director general. 
2006: director/adviser, director general/adviser, positions higher than director general. 2016: director or equivalent, director general or 
equivalent
Table 7 Percentage of officials who report the following coordination behaviour*, by year and rank (lower level officials (L)**/medium and 
higher level officials (MH)*** 
 1996 2006 2016  
 L MH L MH L MH N 
Participation in intra-ministerial coordination committee 
 
Participation low-level inter-ministerial coordination committee 
 
Participation in high-level inter-ministerial coordination committee  
 
Modified/changed own ministry´s position in EU related work due 
to coordination with the Prime Ministers’ Office 
 
Modified/changed own ministry´s position in EU related work due 
to coordination with the MFA 
 
Modified/changed own ministry´s position in EU related work due 
to coordination with other ministries 
 
Modified/changed own ministry´s position in EU related work due 
to coordination with the National Parliament 
 
Modified/changed own ministry´s position in EU related work due 
to coordination with the Interest groups 
71 
 
83 
 
56 
 
 
63 
 
 
63 
 
 
65 
 
 
83 
 
 
76 
29 
 
17 
 
44 
 
 
38 
 
 
37 
 
 
35 
 
 
17 
 
 
24 
62 
 
75 
 
55 
 
 
48 
 
 
54 
 
 
64 
 
 
60 
 
 
58 
38 
 
25 
 
45 
 
 
52 
 
 
46 
 
 
37 
 
 
40 
 
 
42 
73 
 
84 
 
69 
 
 
70 
 
 
73 
 
 
69 
 
 
77 
 
 
77 
27 
 
16 
 
31 
 
 
30 
 
 
27 
 
 
31 
 
 
23 
 
 
23 
100 
(181) 
100 
(116) 
100 (61) 
 
 
100 (35) 
 
 
100 (60) 
 
 
100 (82) 
 
 
100 (20) 
 
 
100 (27) 
*This table applies value 1 on the following three-point scale: (1) multiple times, (2) once, (3) never. 
** Lower level officials include the following ranks:  1996: executive officer, higher executive officer, principal officer, assistant director. 2006: executive officer/adviser, principal officer/adviser, assistant 
director/adviser. 2016: adviser/senior adviser, specialist director/special adviser or equivalent. 
*** Medium and higher level officials include the following ranks: 1996: director, director general, positions higher than director general. 2006: director/adviser, director general/adviser, positions higher than director 
general. 2016: director or equivalent, director general or equivalent 
Table 8 Inter-correlation matrix on coordination behaviour (Pearson’s r, 2016 data) 
 
 
 
 
 
 1)  2) 3) 4) 5) 6) 7) 8) N 
1) Participation in intra-ministerial coordination committee 
 
2) Participation low-level inter-ministerial coordination committee 
 
3) Participation in high-level inter-ministerial coordination committee  
 
4) Modified/changed own ministry´s position in EU related work due to 
coordination with the Prime Ministers’ Office 
 
5) Modified/changed own ministry´s position in EU related work due to 
coordination with the MFA 
 
6) Modified/changed own ministry´s position in EU related work due to 
coordination with other ministries 
 
7) Modified/changed own ministry´s position in EU related work due to 
coordination with the National Parliament 
 
8) Modified/changed own ministry´s position in EU related work due to 
coordination with interest groups 
 .49** 
 
.45** 
 
41** 
 
.16** 
 
.07 
 
.17** 
 
 
 
 
.32** 
 
.22** 
 
.31** 
 
 
.71** 
.26** 
 
.25** 
 
.33** 
 
 
.62** 
 
 
.73** 
.17** 
 
.10 
 
.17** 
 
 
.62** 
 
 
.49** 
 
 
.53** 
.16** 
 
.15** 
 
.19** 
 
 
.36** 
 
 
.49** 
 
 
.60** 
 
 
.69** 
684 
 
568 
 
396 
 
 
359 
 
 
362 
 
 
359 
 
 
351 
Table 9 Percentage of officials who report that the following institutions are important* 
when making decisions on their own policy area, by year 
  1996 2006 2016 
 
 
Primary structures 
Own ministry 
Subordinated agencies 
Other ministries 
National Parliament 
National government 
95 
53 
64 
78 
86 
96 
65 
64 
77 
90 
98 
69 
72 
80 
91 
 
Secondary structures 
Commission 
Council 
European Parliament 
EU agencies 
23 
- 
- 
- 
29 
- 
- 
11 
22 
14 
12 
9 
N  100 
(1043) 
100 
(1007) 
100 
(1340) 
*This table combines values 1 and 2 on a five-point scale: (1) very important, (2) fairly important, (3) somewhat, (4) fairly unimportant, (5) 
very unimportant (6) Do not know/not relevant 
 
Table 10 Percentage of officials who report the following priorities if conflicts occur 
between the wishes of their national political leadership and the requirements of EU law* 
* The table includes those officials that incorporates and/or practices EU legislation within their own policy field. The category ´not 
relevant/not occupied with such tasks´ are coded missing.  
 
   Ministry  Agency 
 Primarily follow the wishes of own political leadership  11  15 
 Try to combine the wishes of own political leadership and EU law  84  68 
 Primarily follow the requirement of EU law  5  17 
 N  608 (100)  476 (100) 
